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social	 policy	 contracts	 disclose,	 simultaneously,	 elements	 of	 mechanical	 and	 organic	 social	
solidarity.	As	such,	these	contracts	can	be	thought	to	function	in	both	punitive	and	restitutive	








aired	 at	 a	workshop	 on	 the	 ‘Power	 of	 Law’	 at	 Helsinki	 Law	 School,	 University	 of	 Helsinki.	 I	 am	 very	 grateful	 to	





structural	 factors	 play	 in	 the	 degree	 to	 which	 these	 programmes	 can	 be	 deemed	 to	 be	
successful.	Reflecting	on	this,	 it	 is	argued	that	 the	moralistic	nature	of	 the	workfare	contract,	













form	 of	 ‘increased	 levels	 of	 anxiety	 around	 migration	 in	 European	 countries’,	 its	 roots,	
according	 to	Delanty,	 can	be	 traced	 to	 changes	 in	 the	 socio-economic	 constitution	of	 Europe	
and	 its	 nation	 states.	 Referring	 to	 the	work	 of	 several	 sociologists,	 including	 that	 of	 Richard	
Sennett	 and	 Jock	 Young,	 Delanty	 charts	 a	 variety	 of	 social	 and	 economic	 transformations	 –	
including	 in	 work,	 the	 family,	 and	 pensions	 –	 that	 have	 contributed	 to	 the	 weakening	 of	
previously	solid	bases	of	solidarity	within	Europe,	including	status	and	class.	Lacking	any	sense	















that	 the	 emergence	 of	 what	 he	 (Bauman)	 calls	 ‘the	 society	 of	 consumers’	 has	 been	
accompanied	 by	 a	 decline	 in	 the	 conditions	 necessary	 for	 the	 existence	 of	 solidarity	 today.4	
With	the	rise	to	prominence	of	the	cult	of	the	consumer	and	the	idea	that	consumers,	rather	
than	 the	 state,	 should	 provide	 for	 their	 own	 care	 needs,	 there	 has	 been	 a	 simultaneous	
diminution	 in	 what	 the	 social	 state	 offers	 by	 way	 of	 welfare	 benefits	 to	 those	 requiring	
assistance.	In	Bauman’s	view,	this	decline	in	‘communally	endorsed,	collective	insurance	against	
individual	misfortune’	detrimentally	affects	solidarity	as	it	removes	one	of	its	key	sources.	This	
type	 of	 insurance	was	 designed	 to	 promote	 solidarity	 by	 creating	 the	 possibility	 of	 a	 society	




there	 is	no	solidarity	to	speak	of	today?	 Is	the	only	way	to	restore	solidarity,	 if	 indeed	that	 is	
achievable,	 to	 seek	 a	 return	 to	 the	Keynesian	 era	with	 its	 emphasis	 on	 full	 employment	 and	












and	 it	 is	 not	 the	 purpose	 of	 this	 article	 to	 address	 them	 in	 any	 detail,	 if	 at	 all.	 Rather,	 the	
objective	here	 is	 to	question	 the	 assumption	 that	 there	 exists	 a	 general	 crisis	 of	 solidarity	 in	
what	will	loosely	be	referred	to	as	contemporary	Western	states.	Or,	to	be	more	precise,	while	
the	foregoing	analysis	may	be	correct	in	identifying	a	crisis	of	solidarity	insofar	as	the	traditional	
sources	of	 solidarity	 are	 in	 the	process	of	 disintegrating,	 this	 does	not	mean	 that	 alternative	
sources	of	solidarity	are	not	emerging	to	take	their	place.	 It	 is	with	these	possible	alternative	
sources	of	solidarity	that	this	article	is	concerned.	
The	 article	 takes	 the	 prominent	 role	 of	 contract	within	 the	 field	 of	 social	 policy	 today	 as	 its	
point	 of	 departure.	 Contract	 has	 become	 a	 key	 mechanism	 through	 which	 social	 policies,	
including	the	traditional	assistance	offered	to	citizens	via	the	welfare	state,	are	 implemented.	




the	benefits	of	 the	 social,	 or	welfare,	 state.	As	 such,	 and	unlike	 the	 social	 rights	of	 the	post-
WWII	 political	 settlement	 identified	 by	 T.H.	 Marshall,7	 these	 contracts	 point	 not	 to	
unconditional	entitlements	of	access	to	the	benefits	of	the	welfare	state,	but	to	a	conditional	
system,	in	which	such	access	may	be	denied	for	failure	to	comply	with	the	state’s	stipulations.	







an	 integral	 component	 of	 today’s	 welfare	 state	 –	 that	 part	 of	 the	 state	 whose	 steady	
retrenchment	is	frequently	identified	in	the	social	science	literature	as	being	a	key	contributory	
factor	in	the	aforementioned	crisis	of	solidarity.	In	other	words,	a	focus	on	these	contracts	will	
allow	 us	 to	 chart	 more	 clearly	 the	 transformation	 in	 the	 sources	 of	 solidarity	 within	 an	
institution	traditionally	defined	by	its	solidarity-producing	properties.	
Largely	 through	an	analysis	of	one	 such	contract	–	 the	workfare	contract8	 –	 it	will	be	argued	
that	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 identify	 two	 forms	 of	 social	 solidarity	 or	 social	 cohesion.	 In	 order	 to	
conceptualise	 these,	 the	 article	 will	 draw	 upon	 some	 of	 Émile	 Durkheim’s	 work	 –	 both	 his	
typology	of	social	solidarity	in	The	Division	of	Labour	in	Society9	and	his	later	work	on	the	notion	
of	 individualism.	 It	 will	 be	 suggested	 that,	 despite	 existing	 within	 social	 and	 economic	
conditions	markedly	different	to	those	by	reference	to	which	Durkheim	developed	his	analysis	
of	 social	 solidarity,	 today’s	 workfare	 contract	 points	 to	 the	 existence	 of	 two	 forms	 of	 social	
solidarity	that	have	much	in	common	with	Durkheim’s	mechanical	and	organic	social	solidarity.	
More	 specifically,	 this	 contract	 contains	 within	 it	 both	 punitive	 and	 restitutive	 elements,	
measures	designed	both	 to	exclude	and	 include	 those	members	of	 the	population	 in	need	of	
assistance.	 In	 turn,	 these	 exclusionary	 and	 inclusive	 measures	 assist	 in	 producing	 social	
solidarity.	It	is	argued,	therefore,	that	the	workfare	contract	reveals	something	important	about	
the	nature	 and	 sources	 of	 contemporary	 social	 solidarity	 or	 cohesion	 in	 social	 and	 economic	









of	 solidarity	 today	 –	 sources	 of	 solidarity	 can	 be	 pinpointed	 in	 the	 post-Keynesian	 era,	 and	
interestingly	within	one	of	the	key	institutions	(the	welfare	state)	whose	steady	withdrawal	has	
been	identified	as	contributing	to	the	suggested	crisis.	Rather,	the	issue,	it	is	claimed	here,	is	to	
seek	 to	understand	 the	 forms	 that	 today’s	 solidarity	 takes	and	how	these	particular	 forms	of	
social	 cohesion	 assist	 in	 maintaining,	 and	 providing	 obstacles	 to	 the	 questioning	 and	
contestation	 of,	 the	 conditions	 necessary	 for,	 inter	 alia,	 ongoing	 poverty,	 hatred	 of	 others,	
insecure	and	poorly	paid	employment,	and	the	misery	and	indignity	Bauman	speaks	of.	In	other	





managed	 the	 issue	 of	 unemployment	 through	 the	 policy	 of	 workfare.	 Workfare,	 or	 labour	
activation,	 as	 it	 is	 also	 known,	 is	 a	 social	 policy	 of	 conditional	 welfare.	 In	 order	 to	 continue	
receiving	 unemployment	 benefits,	welfare	 recipients	must	 undertake	 certain	 tasks	which	 are	
designed	to	(re-)engage	them	in	the	world	of	work.	Should	they	fail	to	undertake	the	stipulated	
tasks,	 their	 benefits	may	 be	 reduced	 and,	 ultimately,	withdrawn.	 Contract	 is	 the	mechanism	
through	which	workfare	operates.	 In	the	UK,	 for	example,	 this	contract	takes	the	form	of	the	




the	 previous	 arrangements,	 whereby	 unemployed	 individuals	 would	 be	 entitled	 to	 benefits	
based	either	on	 their	past	 record	of	national	 insurance	contributions	or	 immediate	need,	 the	
1995	Act	makes	the	receipt,	and	continuation,	of	Jobseeker’s	Allowance	conditional	upon,	inter	
alia,	the	signing	of	a	Jobseekers’	Agreement	that	remains	in	force.11	Amongst	other	things,	this	
Agreement	must	detail	what	 type	of	work	 is	 to	be	 sought	and	what	 steps	are	 to	be	 taken	 in	
looking	 for	 work	 and	 in	 improving	 chances	 of	 finding	 work.	 Various	 sanctions	 flow	 from	 a	


















another,	been	 features	of	unemployment	 legislation	 for	many	 years.	 See	 J.	 Fulbrook,	 ‘The	 Jobseekers	Act	1995:	
Consolidation	With	a	Sting	of	Contractual	Compliance’	(1995)	24	Industrial	Law	Journal	395.	
12
	 Tougher	 sanctions	 for	 refusing	 to	 participate	 in	 schemes	 designed	 to	 return	 the	 unemployed	 to	 work	 are	
contained	 in	 the	 Welfare	 Reform	 Act	 2009.	 Section	 1	 of	 the	 2009	 Act,	 which	 inserts	 a	 new	 s.17A	 into	 the	





(that	 is,	the	creation	of	 ‘a	welfare	state	where	virtually	everyone	is	either	 looking	for	work	or	
preparing	for	work’).13	The	overriding	objective	was	to	get	people	back	into	work,	as	work,	the	
Government	 said,	 was	 the	 surest	 means	 of	 escaping	 poverty.	 In	 terms	 of	 contributing	 to	
reducing	the	unemployment	figures,	New	Labour’s	policies	were	clearly	a	success.	As	the	White	
Paper	 notes,	 the	 number	 of	 people	 in	work	 during	 the	 summer	 of	 2008	 in	 the	UK	was	 29.5	
million	 –	 an	 all-time	high.	Moreover,	 the	 number	 of	 people	 claiming	welfare	 benefits	 at	 this	
time	was	 fewer	 than	one	million,	a	clear	 improvement	on	 the	1992	 figure,	which	was	almost	
three	million.	
While	 the	philosophy	of	 reciprocity	 underlying	workfare	 is	 by	 no	means	novel	 in	 the	 field	 of	









	 Department	 for	 Work	 and	 Pensions’	 White	 Paper,	 Raising	 Expectations	 and	 Increasing	 Support:	 Reforming	
Welfare	for	the	Future	Cm	7506	(2008),	7-8.	The	lengths	to	which	the	Labour	Government	went	in	ensuring	that,	as	
far	 as	 possible,	 ‘no	 one	 is	 left	 behind’	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 s.2	 of	 the	Welfare	 Reform	 Act	 2009,	 which	 obliges	 lone	
parents	on	 income	 support	 and	who	have	 children	aged	 three	or	 above	 to	undertake	work-related	activity	 as	 a	
condition	of	continued	entitlement	to	the	full	amount	of	income	support.	
14
	 In	 his	 1942	 report	 Social	 Insurance	 and	 Allied	 Services	 (1942),	 Sir	William	 Beveridge	 set	 out	 a	welfare	 policy	










are	 free	 to	 determine	 the	 nature	 of	 their	 contractual	 obligations);	 consent	 (in	 other	 words,	
parties	voluntarily	enter	 into	agreements	rather	than	being	coerced	to	do	so);	and	reciprocity	
or	mutuality	(that	both	parties	benefit	from	the	contract	through	the	mutual	exchange	of	acts	




decisions	 regarding	 the	 nature	 of	 their	 agreements	 lie.	 Theoretically,	 the	 parties	 are	 free	 to	
bargain	and	negotiate	over	the	terms	of	their	contracts,	and	the	rights	and	obligations	within	
these,	with	a	view	to	ending	up	with	an	agreement	that	reflects	their	choices	and	wishes.	The	





a	 contract	 at	 all.	 Peter	 Vincent-Jones,	 for	 instance,	 has	 argued	 that	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 call	 this	
Agreement	 a	 contract	 as	 it	 complies	 poorly	 with	 a	 number	 of	 common	 contract	 norms,	
including	reciprocity,	consent,	and	choice.	The	latter,	for	example,	is	largely	a	myth	as	genuine	
options	are	frequently	not	offered	in	practice.	Similarly,	consent	is	more	theoretical	than	real	as	




Vincent-Jones,	 ‘Contractual	 Governance:	 Institutional	 and	 Organizational	 Analysis’	 (2000)	 20	 Oxford	 Journal	 of	










amounting	 to	 a	 genuine	 agreement	 between	 the	 citizen	 and	 the	 state	 based	 on	 freedom	 of	
choice,	 reciprocity	etc.	 (‘the	rhetoric	of	contract’	here	being	read	 in	a	dismissive	sense	–	 ‘the	
Government	is	just	pretending	that	this	Agreement	is	a	contract,	whereas,	really,	it	is	not	one’),	
as	 noted	 above	 the	 use	 of	 contract	 in	 the	 field	 of	 social	 policy	 has	 what	 might	 be	 called	
symbolic,	 or	 ideological,	 power.	 Even	 though	 social	 policy	 contracts	 may	 not	 technically	 be	
contracts,	 the	 utility	 of	 deploying	 contract	 as	 a	 tool	 of	 state	 power	 is	 that	 it	 assists	 in	 both	
reflecting	and	conditioning	the	manner	in	which	social	issues	are	conceptualised.	In	particular,	
and	 as	 several	 authors,	 including	 Vincent-Jones,	 have	 noted,	 it	 facilitates	 a	 focus	 on	 the	
individual	as	the	key	actor	in	the	creation	and	remedying	of	social	problems.	It	is	the	behaviour,	
empowerment,	 responsibilisation,	 and	 utility	 of	 individuals,	 rather	 than	 the	 macroeconomic	
policy	of	 the	Government	of	 the	day,	 for	 example,	 that	have	become	 the	 foci	when	 thinking	
																																																																																																																																																																																																																				
Freedland	and	D.	King,	 ‘Contractual	Governance	and	 Illiberal	Contracts:	 Some	Problems	of	Contractualism	as	an	






14	 Indiana	 Journal	 of	 Global	 Legal	 Studies	 279.	 In	 Campbell’s	 view,	 this	 ‘erosion	 of	 the	 individual	 dimension	 of	






flow	 from	 their	 breach.	Whether	 or	 not	 these	 ‘contracts’	 can	 be	 said	 to	 involve	 reciprocity,	
bargaining	etc.	and	thus	amount	to	proper	contracts,	their	real	purchase	lies	in	the	assumption	
that	the	citizens	subject	to	them	have	made	an	agreement	and	that	they	have	an	obligation	to	
stick	 to	 it.	 This	 symbolic	 power	 of	 contract	 points	 to	 an	 understanding	 of	 ‘the	 rhetoric	 of	
contract’	which	 is	 different	 to	 that	 of	 the	 ‘this	 does	 not	meet	 the	 threshold	 contract	 norms	
necessary	 for	a	contract’	variety.	For	here,	 contract’s	 rhetorical	power	 resides	 in	 its	ability	 to	
coincide	with	broader	ideas	and	understandings	of	the	nature	of	contemporary	society.	As	John	
Harrington	 has	 written	 in	 another	 context:	 ‘As	 rhetoric,	 in	 the	 classical	 sense,	 relevant	



















The	 types	of	principles	described	 in	 the	previous	 section	and	 the	 image	of	 social	 relations	 to	




only	to	subsistence	but	to	what	he	calls	 ‘social	usefulness’	–	not	 just	the	right	to	 live	but	 ‘the	
right	 to	 live	 in	 society.’21	 These	 contracts,	 with	 their	 mutual	 set	 of	 responsibilities	 (on	 the	
individual	 and	 the	 state),	 he	 argues,	 point	 to	 a	 notion	 of	 the	 individual	 as	 ‘an	 autonomous,	




of	 state	 welfare	 by	 placing	 in	 their	 hands	 the	 responsibility	 to	 take	 ownership	 of	 their	
unemployment	 by	 actively	 adopting	 measures	 to	 (re-)integrate	 themselves	 into	 the	 labour	







What	 is	 interesting	 about	 Rosanvallon’s	 analysis	 is	 the	 relationship	 he	 identifies	 between	
contract,	social	policy,	and	the	reaffirmation	of	society	(the	construction	of	social	bonds).	In	his	
view,	 the	 benefit	 of	 introducing	 contract	 into	 the	 field	 of	 social	 policy	 lies	 not	 only	 in	 re-
integrating	the	particular	individual	into	society	and	emphasising	to	him	or	her	the	importance	
of	responsibility	and	honouring	commitments,	but	 in	the	reaffirmation	of	society	which	these	
two	 factors	 facilitate.	Whereas	a	welfare	 state	based	on	collective	 insurance	merely	provides	
individuals	with	the	social	right	to	access	the	means	of	subsistence,	the	corresponding	right	of	
today’s	welfare	state	exceeds	 this	 to	 incorporate	 ‘a	moral	 imperative’	 too	–	 the	 right	 to	be	a	
socially	useful	member	of	 society.	As	opposed	 to	 the	 right	 to	 subsistence,	which	Rosanvallon	
equates	 to	 passivity,	 the	 latter	 right	 is	 bound	 up	 with	 activity	 and	 the	 notion	 of	 active	
citizenship.	In	his	view,	this	type	of	citizenship,	and	its	corresponding	right	to	social	usefulness,	
forms	 the	 basis	 of	 a	 new	 type	 of	 contemporary	 solidarity.	 It	 results	 in	 the	 excluded	 (re-
)engaging	 or	 participating	 in	 society	 and	 converts	 the	 welfare	 recipients	 of	 the	 system	 of	
collective	insurance	into	citizens.	
One	of	 the	 consequences	of	Rosanvallon’s	 argument	 is	 that	 it	 is	 by	means	of	 a	 focus	on	 the	
individual	that	today’s	social	solidarity	is	likely	to	come	about.	The	source	of	social	solidarity	is,	
in	 a	 sense,	 the	 individual.	 No	 longer	 is	 it	 class	 or	 status	 that	 define	 the	 source	 of	 social	
solidarity;	 it	 is	 not	 what	 Rosanvallon	 calls	 ‘general	 populations’	 that	 are	 the	 target	 of	 the	
welfare	 state.	 Rather,	 it	 is	 the	 specific	 individual	 in	 need	 of	 help,	 together	 with	 his	 or	 her	







contract	 are	 not	 to	 be	 seen	 as	 curbing	 individual	 freedom,	 but	 as	 a	 means	 of	 ‘constructing	
society’.	 These	 obligations	 are	 the	 source	 of	 social	 cohesion.	 The	 result	 is	 ‘a	 contractual	
individualism	combining	respect	for	the	individual	with	the	reconstruction	of	the	social	bond.’23	
Rosanvallon	 is	 not	 alone	 in	his	 analysis	 of	 the	 changing	nature	 and	purpose	of	 today’s	 social	
state.	 For	 instance,	 by	 reference	 to	 some	 of	Michel	 Foucault’s	 later	 work,	 Jacques	 Donzelot	
charts	a	shift	 from	the	welfare	to	the	social	 investment	state.24	Unlike	the	traditional	welfare	
state,	which	sought	to	compensate	for	the	injustices	produced	by	the	operation	of	markets,	the	
social	 investment	 state	 is	 designed	 to	 ensure	 that	 public	 funds	 are	 invested	 in	 training	 and	
educational	 programmes,	 like	 those	 associated	with	 workfare,	 whose	 purpose	 is	 to	 produce	
individuals	with	 the	ability	 to	enter	 and	 compete	within	 these	markets,	 and	who,	 thereafter,	
will	no	longer	require	assistance	from	the	state.	 In	Donzelot’s	words:	 ‘In	short,	social	policy	 is	



















state	 is	 defined	 by	 its	 emphasis	 on	 creating	 equal	 opportunities	 for	 all	 to	 participate	 in	 the	
market	 rather	 than,	 as	 was	 the	 case	 with	 the	 traditional	 welfare	 state,	 on	 the	 reduction	 of	
social	 inequalities	which	only	considers	income.	As	with	Rosanvallon’s	analysis,	the	underlying	
rationale	 of	 the	 social	 investment	 state	 is	 one	 of	 inclusion.	 The	 objective	 of	 providing	 (or	
investing)	public	funds	is	to	ensure	that	individuals	who	have	been	unable	to	participate	in	the	




Or	 rather,	 it	 enables	 us	 to	 see	 how	 in	 order	 to	 retain	 its	 resources	 and	 effectiveness	 this	
compromise	calls	for	revision	and	adaptation	rather	than	for	a	tooth	and	nail	defence	of	it	as	it	
is.’26	
The	 foregoing	analyses	point	 to	both	 the	changing	nature	and	purposes	of	 the	welfare	 state,	
and	the	central	 role	that	contract	plays	 in	a	major	aspect	of	 today’s	social	policy.	Specifically,	
they	 stress	 the	 emphasis	 on	 the	 need	 to	 invest	 public	 resources	 in	 individuals	 who	 act	










boundaries	 of	 “normal”	 life.27	 And,	 at	 least	 for	 Rosanvallon,	 it	 is	 this	 inclusive	 approach,	
revolving	 around	 individuals	 and	 their	 particular	 biographies	 and	 needs,	 that	 offers	 the	 best	
chance	of	establishing	solidarity	through	social	policy	today.	
This	 vision	 of	 the	 inclusive	 society	 does	 not,	 however,	 constitute	 the	 sole	 foundation	 or	
rationale	 advanced	 for	 the	workfare	 contract.	 Rather,	 this	 contract	 contains	 an	 exclusionary	
element	 too,	 that	 provides	 for	 the	 possible	 reduction	 and	withdrawal	 of	 the	 types	 of	 social	
benefits	 associated	 with	 the	 welfare	 state.	 Thus,	 as	 we	 saw	 earlier,	 if	 you	 do	 not	 sign	 the	
Jobseekers’	Agreement	or	fail	to	comply	with	the	obligations	within	it,	your	welfare	benefits	will	
be	 reduced,	 and	 ultimately,	 possibly	 withdrawn	 for	 a	 period	 of	 up	 to	 26	 weeks.28	 This	
threatened	consequence	would	appear	 to	be	 irreconcilable	with	Rosanvallon’s	analysis	of	 the	
workfare	 contract,	 which	 interpreted	 this	 as	 a	 vehicle	 of	 the	 unemployed	 individual’s	 re-
socialisation	 and,	 through	 this,	 of	 the	 reaffirmation	 of	 society.	 With	 its	 rights	 to	 ‘social	
usefulness’	and	‘to	live	in	society’,	the	new	welfare	state	(or	social	investment	state)	is	designed	
with	the	objective	of	giving	rise	 to	 ‘the	 inclusive	society’,	which	extends	 far	beyond	the	basic	
right	 to	 subsistence	 of	 the	 traditional	welfare	 state,	 based	 as	 it	was	 on	 collective	 insurance.	






the	 European	 Dream’,	 in	 V.	 Ruggiero,	 N.	 South	 and	 I.	 Taylor	 (eds.),	 The	New	 European	 Criminology:	 Crime	 and	
Social	Order	 in	 Europe	 (1998),	 Ch.	 4.	Unlike	 Young,	who	 argues	 that	 the	 assimilative	 state	was	 one	 of	 the	 core	
‘premises	of	modernism’	(i.e.	that	 it	was	an	 integral	 feature	of	the	traditional	welfare	state	from	which	we	have	
departed)	 which	 no	 longer	 captures	 contemporary	 social	 relations,	 the	 analyses	 of	 Rosanvallon	 and	 Donzelot	
suggest	that	this	‘state’	is	very	much	alive	and	well	today.	
28







be	 germane	 to	 the	 production	 of	 solidarity	 in	 the	 new	welfare	 state,	 as	 it	 would	 fail	 to	 re-
integrate	the	unemployed	and,	thus,	to	reaffirm	society.	
But	 is	 this	 so?	 In	 other	 words,	 are	 these	 inclusive	 and	 exclusionary	 aspects	 of	 the	 workfare	
contract	 necessarily	 irreconcilable?	 If	 they	 are,	 can	 this	 irreconcilability	 be	 traced	 to	 the	
question	of	solidarity,	in	the	sense	that	the	inclusive	society	is	associated	with	the	presence	of	
solidarity	while	the	exclusionary	society	is	not?		The	purpose	of	the	remainder	of	this	article	is	
to	 offer	 negative	 responses	 to	 these	 questions.	 Before	 developing	 the	 argument	 further,	
though,	it	is	necessary	to	discuss	in	a	bit	more	detail	the	nature	of	this	exclusionary	component	
of	the	workfare	contract	and	what	it	reveals	about	the	function	of	today’s	welfare	state.	
In	 his	 recent	 book,	 Punishing	 the	 Poor,29	 Loïc	 Wacquant	 advances	 a	 thesis	 of	 how	 the	
remarkable	 rise	 in	 punitive	 responses	 of	 recent	 years	 (especially	 in	 the	 US,	 but	 increasingly	
within	 Europe	 and	 Latin	 America	 too)	 is	 a	 key	 component	 of	 the	 implementation	 of	 neo-
liberalism.	 He	 argues	 that	 the	 re-emergence	 of	 the	 penal	 state	 today	 is	 not	 a	 response	 to	
criminal,	but	to	social,	 insecurity.	Focusing	on	the	dramatic	rise	 in	prison	populations	 in	some	
Western	 countries	 and	 the	 policy	 of	 workfare,	 Wacquant	 traces	 what	 he	 takes	 to	 be	 these	
punitive	measures	back	 to	 the	underlying	philosophies	and	practices	of	neo-liberalism.	These	








bottom	of	 the	socio-economic	hierarchy,	 this	 social	 insecurity,	which	often	expresses	 itself	 in	
petty	 crime	 and	 social	 disorder,	 is	 dealt	 with	 by	 the	 penal	 arm	 of	 the	 state.	 This	 punitive	
response,	 however,	 also	 works	 as	 a	 way	 of	 managing	 the	 social	 insecurity	 increasingly	
experienced	 by	 the	 middle	 classes	 as	 governments	 succeed	 in	 converting	 the	 middle	 class	
disenchantment	 produced	 by	 the	 state’s	 withdrawal	 on	 the	 social	 and	 economic	 fronts	 into	
impatience	with	the	social	and	moral	disorder	perceived	to	be	the	way	of	life	of	petty	criminals,	
single	mothers,	welfare	 recipients	 and	 other	 “irresponsible”	 groups.	 According	 to	Wacquant,	
this	 punitive	mode	 of	 governing	 social	 insecurity	 therefore	 lends	much	 needed	 legitimacy	 to	
politicians,	 as	 it	 allows	 them	 to	 claim	 that	 they	 are	 working	 to	 maintain	 citizens’	 physical	
security	 or	 safety	 while	 simultaneously	 withdrawing	 the	 types	 of	 long-standing	 social	 safety	
nets	traditionally	associated	with	the	welfare	state.	Meanwhile:	
[F]or	 the	 upper	 class	 as	 well	 as	 the	 society	 as	 a	 whole,	 the	 endless	 and	 boundless	 activism	 of	 the	 penal	
institution	 serves	 the	 symbolic	 mission	 of	 reaffirming	 the	 authority	 of	 the	 state	 and	 the	 newfound	 will	 of	
political	 elites	 to	 emphasize	 and	 enforce	 the	 sacred	 border	 between	 commendable	 citizens	 and	 deviant	
categories,	 the	 “deserving”	 and	 the	 “undeserving”	 poor,	 those	 who	 merit	 being	 salvaged	 and	 “inserted”	








also	clear	 from	the	earlier	discussion	 in	 this	article	 regarding	 the	nature	of	workfare	 that	 the	
workfare	contract	 incorporates	an	exclusionary	element.	The	 failure	 to	abide	by	 the	 terms	of	






and,	 should	 this	 persist,	 ultimately	 its	 withdrawal	 from	 the	 unemployed	 individual.	 It	 is	
suggested	 that	 the	 existence	 of	 this	 punitive	 exclusion,	 whereby	 the	 workfare	 contract	
entertains	the	prospect	of	the	de-socialisation	of	citizens	by	way	of	the	deprivation	of	material	
assistance,	also	maps	onto	the	types	of	Manichaeistic	categories	identified	by	Wacquant	in	the	
preceding	 quotation.	 Those	who	 do	 not	 undertake	 their	 obligation	 to	work	 or	 participate	 in	
work-related	activity	or	training,	will,	like	those	in	the	previous	system	who	were	deemed	to	be	
quite	content	 to	 live	a	 life	on	benefits,	no	doubt	be	categorised	as,	 inter	alia,	 lazy,	work-shy,	
shirking	 their	 responsibilities,	and	benefit	 fraudsters.	The	difference	 is	 that	 those	who	do	not	
comply	 with	 this	 obligation	 are	 now	 effectively	 ejected	 from	 the	 realm	 of	 the	 social	 –	
‘banished’,	 to	 use	 Wacquant’s	 phrase.	 The	 possibility	 of	 this	 ejection	 has	 important	
implications;	 for	 the	 ejectees	 to	 be	 sure,	 but	 also,	 it	 is	 suggested	 here,	 as	 a	 source	 of	 social	
solidarity	 or	 social	 cohesion.	 To	 implement	 the	 sanction	 of	 withdrawing	 material	 resources	
from	 citizens	 reaffirms	 society	 (in	 Rosanvallon’s	 phrase).	De-socialisation	 founds	 society.	 This	
exclusion	not	only	 reinforces	 the	prevailing	 consensus	around	 those	deemed	 to	be	deserving	
and	those	who	are	not;	it	also	ensures	the	perpetuation	of	a	system	that	measures	the	strength	
of	social	cohesion	by	the	extent	to	which	certain	core	moral	values	or	norms	are	upheld.	These	
values	 or	 norms,	 it	 is	 suggested	 here,	 include	 respect,	 self-discipline,	 the	 work	 ethic,	 self-
dependency	rather	than	dependency	on	the	state,	and	functioning	as	a	useful,	as	opposed	to	
useless,	member	of	society.	Thus,	the	punishment	of	those	who	fail	to	live	up	to	such	values	or	
norms	has	 the	effect	of	 re-emphasising	 these	and	helping	 to	 shore	up	 the	 social	 solidarity	 to	
which	 they	 give	 rise.	 More	 than	 this,	 it	 demonstrates	 the	 vital	 role	 that	 stigma	 plays	 as	 a	
Page	|	20		
	





Crucially,	 though,	 those	 who	 are	 punished	 for	 their	 failure	 to	 participate,	 are	 not	 entirely	
removed	or	excluded	 from	society	 (for	 instance,	by	being	 imprisoned).	While	deprived	of	 the	
resources	necessary	for	their	socialisation,	they	remain	within	the	space	of	society	and	are	thus	
still	 available	 as	 an	 outlet	 for	 the	 sustenance	 of	 the	 types	 of	 moralising	 discourses	 and	
categorisations	upon	which	today’s	social	cohesion,	at	least	in	part,	depends.	
The	 exclusionary	 component	 of	 workfare	 contracts,	 with	 its	 tendency	 to	 lead	 to	 the	
categorisation	 of	 parts	 of	 the	 population,	 therefore	 suggests	 that	 Rosanvallon’s	 depiction	 of	
workfare	as	a	policy	focussed	solely	on	individuals	and	their	particular	circumstances,	does	not	
tell	 the	 full	 story.	 Rather,	 it	 needs	 to	 be	 complemented	 by	 an	 acknowledgement	 that	 the	
grouping	or	classification	of	some	parts	of	society	forms	an	integral	dimension	of	the	workfare	







	 In	 the	 context	 of	 workfare,	 this	 process	 has	 been	 facilitated	 formally	 by	 the	 previous	 Labour	 Government’s	
recent	 legislation	on	welfare	 (the	Welfare	Reform	Act	2009),	which	extends	workfare	explicitly	 to	 lone	mothers	
with	children	aged	three	or	above,	and	to	those	on	incapacity	benefit	deemed	fit	to	work.	Like	others,	the	failure	
of	 those	 groups	 to	 participate	 in	workfare	 schemes	will	 lead	 to	 a	 reduction	 in,	 or	 withdrawal	 of,	 their	 welfare	







justice	 system	 becomes	 the	 mechanism	 through	 which	 the	 status	 insecurity	 of	 the	 middle	
classes	is	mollified,	if	not	solved.	Indeed,	as	Bauman	persuasively	argues	in	his	discussion	of	the	
term	 ‘underclass’,	 the	 tendency	 today	 to	 lump	 together	 a	 variety	 of	 different	 populations	 –	
inter	alia,	 illegal	 immigrants,	drug	addicts,	 and	 single	mothers	–	 into	one	stigmatised	class	of	
poor	people	is,	in	itself,	‘a	classificatory	decision’:	
Plunging	 them	all	 into	one	category	 is	a	classificatory	decision,	not	 the	verdict	of	 facts;	condensing	 them	 into	
one	entity,	charging	them	all,	collectively,	with	uselessness	and	with	harbouring	awesome	dangers	to	the	rest	of	





This	 class	 of	 the	 ‘useless’	 and	 ‘dangerous’	 is	 not	 a	 natural	 phenomenon,	 but	 a	 necessary	
construction;	 one	 designed	 to	 serve	 the	 purposes	 of	 those	 doing	 the	 constructing.	 In	 the	
argument	 presented	 in	 this	 article,	 it	 serves	 the	 need	 of	 social	 solidarity	 or	 cohesion.	 The	
identification	and	classification	of	specific	target	groups	in	the	context	of	workfare	feeds	into,	
and	reinforces,	populist	notions	of	those	groups,	and	the	idea	that	it	is	morally	disingenuous	to	














contract	 one	 detects	 a	 dual	 foundation	 for	 the	 production	 of	 social	 bonds	 and,	 to	 use	
Rosanvallon’s	phrase,	the	reaffirmation	of	society.	The	inclusive	element	points	not	only	to	the	
importance	of	work	as	a	way	of	(re-)socialising	those	in	receipt	of	welfare	benefits,	but	crucially,	
to	the	centrality	of	 the	 individual	 to	this	process.	 It	 is	with	the	 individual’s	specific	needs	and	
biography,	 together	 with	 the	 objective	 of	 producing	 autonomous,	 responsible,	 and	 self-
disciplined	 citizens,	 that	 the	 workfare	 contract	 is	 concerned.	 And	 it	 is	 this	 ‘contractual	
individualism’	 that	 acts	 as	 a	 key	 source	 of	 social	 solidarity	 today.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 and	
simultaneously,	 the	 bonds	 of	 society	 are	 strengthened	 through	 the	 possibility	 of	 excluding	
those	 who	 fail	 to	 undertake	 the	 obligations	 contained	 in	 the	 workfare	 contract.	 The	 de-
socialisation	 that	 flows	 from	 this	 exclusion	 paradoxically	 offers	 up	 a	 further	 source	 of	
reaffirming	society,	not	least	because	of	the	tendency	to	classify	those	individuals	into	a	larger,	
amorphous	grouping	of,	to	use	Bauman’s	term,	the	useless.	Such	populist	characterisations	play	
a	 crucial	 role	 in	 reaffirming	 and	 strengthening	 the	 social	 bonds	 amongst	 respectable	 and	
upstanding	 citizens.	 The	 purpose	 of	 the	 following	 section	 is	 to	 reflect	 on	 how	 we	 might	
conceptualise	 this	 dual	 foundation	 of	 social	 solidarity	 inherent	 in	 today’s	 workfare	 contract.		








of	 social	 solidarity	 in	The	Division	 of	 Labour	 in	 Society.34	While	 his	 thesis	 is	well	 known,	 it	 is	
necessary	 to	 identify	 those	key	parts	of	 it	which	are	 relevant	 to	 the	argument	 to	be	pursued	
here.35	 For	 Durkheim,	 social	 solidarity	meant	 the	 way	 in	 which	 societies	 were	 integrated	 or	
given	cohesion.	He	argued	that	social	solidarity	had	moral	foundations	–	social	solidarity	gave	
expression	 to	 the	 underlying	 morality	 existing	 within	 identifiable	 historical	 communities.36	
Moreover,	 he	 suggested	 that	 in	 order	 to	 determine	 the	 type	 of	 social	 solidarity,	 and	 thus	
morality,	 existing	 at	 any	 one	 time,	 one	 could	 turn	 to	 the	 law,	 as	 law	 expressed	 society’s	
morality.	 Indeed,	 owing	 to	 the	 impossibility	 of	 measuring	 the	 moral	 phenomenon	 of	 social	
solidarity,	it	was	necessary	to	have	recourse	to	a	symbolic	entity	such	as	law	to	gain	insight	into	
the	 extant	 forms	 of	 social	 solidarity.	 Famously,	 Durkheim	 divided	 his	 conceptions	 of	 social	
solidarity	 into	 what	 he	 called	 mechanical	 and	 organic	 social	 solidarity.	 Mechanical	 social	
solidarity,	which	was	dominant	 in	primitive	 societies,	exists	where	 there	are	 strong	collective	
beliefs	or	sentiments	within	a	society.	This	form	of	social	solidarity	is	accompanied	by	what	he	
called	 ‘repressive	 law’	 –	 that	 is,	 law	 that	 punishes	 acts	 transgressing	 the	 collective	








Hunt,	 The	 Sociological	 Movement	 in	 Law	 (1978),	 Ch.	 4,	 and	 A.	 Giddens,	 Durkheim	 (1986),	 Ch.	 6.	 It	 is	 not	 the	
purpose	of	 this	article	 to	 review	this	critical	 commentary.	Rather,	whilst	acknowledging	 the	strength	of	 some	of	
this	 critique,	 it	 is	 contended	 that	 some	 key	 aspects	 of	 Durkheim’s	 theses	 are	 helpful	 in	 thinking	 through	 the	
relationship	between	social	policy	contracts	and	social	solidarity.	
36
	 The	 centrality	 of	 morality	 to	 Durkheim’s	 work	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 the	 following	 statement:	 ‘[M]orality	 is	 the	




...	 Its	 real	 function	 is	 to	maintain	 inviolate	 the	cohesion	of	 society	by	sustaining	 the	common	




labour,	 where	 there	 is	 a	 plurality	 of	 beliefs	 and	 values.	 Nonetheless,	 different	 social	 groups	
depend	on	each	other,	and	through	the	performance	of	their	distinct	functions,	that	is,	through	
the	division	of	 labour,	 social	 solidarity	 is	produced.	 In	contrast	 to	 the	expiatory	nature	of	 the	





Whereas,	as	noted,	 the	 individual	was	simply	part	of	 the	collective	 in	 the	 former	 type,	 in	 the	
latter,	 individuals	 are	 viewed	 as	 being	 different	 from	each	other,	with	 each	of	 us	 ‘ha[ving]	 a	
sphere	of	action	that	is	peculiarly	our	own,	and	consequently	a	personality.’41	And	the	degree	
of	this	‘free	space’	is	directly	proportionate	to	the	degree	of	social	solidarity	that	exists,	so	that	
















modern	social	 solidarity.	On	 the	one	hand,	 this	 idea	stressed	 the	need	 to	 respect	 the	human	
dignity	and	 freedom	of	all	 individuals	–	values	 that	would	produce	reciprocal	 relations	within	











solidarity	expressed	through	 today’s	workfare	contract.	 In	a	general	 sense,	 this	utility	derives	
from	Durkheim’s	focus	on	the	moral	basis	of	social	solidarity.	For	the	workfare	contract	can,	at	
least	in	one	sense,	be	interpreted	as	a	‘moral’	instrument,	symbolising	and	giving	expression	to	
the	moral	 foundations	of	 social	 solidarity.	 Two	 instances	of	 this	 can	be	highlighted.	 First,	 the	
workfare	 contract	 is	 in	 keeping	 with	 Durkheim’s	 mechanical	 solidarity.	 This	 is	 because	 the	
sanction	for	breaching,	or	failing	to	enter,	the	contract	 is	a	punitive	one,	taking	the	form	of	a	
reduction	 in,	 or	 removal	 of,	 the	 public	 goods	 provided	 by	 the	welfare	 state.	 This	 repressive	
sanction,	which	threatens	individuals	with	de-socialisation,	can	have	the	effect	of	emphasising	
and	 asserting	 a	 collective	 set	 of	 beliefs	 or	 sentiments.	 It	 is	 suggested	 that	 these	 beliefs	 or	
sentiments	 revolve	 around	 the	 types	 of	 moral	 values	 or	 norms	 outlined	 earlier,	 including	






state.	 Failure	 to	 act	 in	 accordance	 with	 such	 values	 or	 norms	 not	 only	 brings	 detrimental	
consequences	for	the	individuals	involved;	but	through	these	consequences,	the	belief	system	
defined	 by	 these	 values	 is	 emphasised	 and	 strengthened,	 thereby	 contributing	 to	 the	
maintenance	of	cohesion	in	contemporary	society.	For	instance,	the	eviction	from	their	council	
home	 of	 those	 individuals	 (and	 their	 families)	 who	 are	 found	 to	 have	 breached	 acceptable	
behaviour	contracts	by	engaging	in	so-called	anti-social	or	nuisance	behaviour	has	the	effect	of	
reaffirming	 prevailing	 beliefs	 or	 sentiments	 about	 acceptable	 norms	 of	 behaviour.	 Here,	 ‘the	
individual	 ...	 is	 literally	 a	 thing	 at	 the	 disposal	 of	 society.’	 Moreover,	 and	 in	 light	 of	 the	










dependable	 outlets	 for	 its	 almost	 daily	 reaffirmation.	 The	 combination	 of	 classifications	 and	




restoration	 of	 social	 relations,	 that	 today’s	 punitive	 source	 of	 social	 solidarity	 within	 social	
policy	is	expressed.	
Today’s	social	policy	contracts	point,	however,	in	the	direction	of	a	second	moral	foundation	of	
contemporary	 social	 solidarity.	 This	 has	 more	 in	 keeping	 with	 Durkheim’s	 modern	 social	
solidarity.	One	can	detect	 in	social	policy	contracts	a	conception	of	social	solidarity	based	not	
only	 on	 the	 need	 to	 respect	 individuals	 and	 their	 autonomy	 and	 human	 dignity,	 but	 on	 the	
expectation	 that	 these	 individuals	will	discharge	 their	 responsibility	 to	society	by	undertaking	





he	 later	advanced	 for	 the	 social	 solidarity	 typical	of	 complex	modern	 societies.	 In	one	 sense,	
then,	 the	 social	 policy	 contract	 expresses	 an	 image	 of	 social	 solidarity	 as	 founded	 on	 the	
individual	and	his	or	her	active	reintegration	into	social	life	(re-socialisation).	The	objective	here	
is	 not	 to	 punish	 but	 to	mend	 broken	 social	 relations	 by	 ‘facilitat[ing]	 social	 interaction’	 and	
restoring	the	status	quo	ante.	And,	like	Durkheim,	who	identified	contract	law	as	one	of	the	key	
components	of	the	restitutive	law	that	symbolised	organic	social	solidarity,	it	is,	once	again,	the	
medium	 of	 contract	 that	 today	 expresses	 the	 mending	 of	 social	 relations	 based	 on	 active	






what	might	 be	 called	 individualism	 –	 constitute	 the	 sources	 of	 that	 form	 of	 social	 solidarity	
pertaining	to	Rosanvallon’s	inclusive	society.	
While	not	detracting	 from	the	utility	of	Durkheim’s	analysis	of	organic	 social	 solidarity	 for	an	
understanding	 of	 today’s	 social	 policy	 contracts,	 the	 former	 does	 not	 perfectly	 fit	 the	 latter.	
Unlike	Durkheim’s	thesis,	the	restitutive	component	of	the	social	policy	contract	does	not	flow	
from	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 sanctions	 consequent	 upon	 its	 breach.	Whereas	 Durkheim	 identified	
restitutive	law	with,	for	example,	the	payment	of	damages	as	a	means	of	restoring	the	parties	




wider	 settlement	 or,	 we	 might	 say,	 contract.	 With	 respect	 to	 workfare,	 for	 instance,	 the	
restitutive	element	of	the	contracts	associated	with	this	lies	in	the	objective	of	re-socialising	the	
unemployed	 through	 work.	 This	 is	 the	meaning	 to	 be	 ascribed	 to	 Durkheim’s	 ‘restoring	 the	
past,	 so	 far	 as	 possible,	 to	 its	 normal	 state’43	 in	 this	 context.	 It	 is	 in	 the	mending	 of	 a	more	
general	social	breakdown	that	restitution	resides.	And,	as	with	Durkheim’s	later	analysis	of	the	
roots	 of	modern	 social	 solidarity,	 and	 Rosanvallon’s	 inclusive	 society,	 it	 is	 individualism	 that	
forms	the	moral	basis	of	that	restitutive	moment.	Workfare	schemes	and	programmes	are	set	
up	by	the	state,	to	be	sure.	But,	equally,	it	is	through	the	individual	–	the	active	citizen	–	and	the	







social	policy	 contracts	do	not	map	 squarely	onto	Durkheim’s	notion	of	organic	 solidarity,	 the	
underlying	moral	foundation	of	his	later	idea	of	modern	social	solidarity	–	individualism	–	finds	
its	 direct	 expression	 in	 these	 contracts	 as	 a	 key	 basis	 upon	which	 the	 re-socialisation	 of	 the	
unemployed	 is	 meant	 to	 occur.	 To	 deploy	 Rosanvallon’s	 phraseology,	 it	 is	 by	 means	 of	
contractual	individualism	that	the	reaffirmation	of	society	is	made	possible.	
Despite	its	development	in	the	context	of	distinct	historical	periods,	Durkheim’s	analysis	of	the	
forms	 of	 social	 solidarity	 and	 their	 modes	 of	 expression	 can	 reveal	 something	 about	 the	
relationship	 between	 social	 policy	 and	 social	 solidarity	 today.	 Specifically,	 it	 illustrates	 the	
exclusionary	 (repressive)	 and	 inclusive	 (restitutive)	 aspects	 of	 social	 solidarity.	 And	 while	
Durkheim	 acknowledged	 that	 both	 could	 co-exist	 within	 a	 particular	 society	 (e.g.	 industrial	
society),	 either	 the	 exclusionary	 or	 the	 inclusive	 form	 tended	 to	 dominate.	 In	 the	 present	
context,	 we	 are	 confronted	with	 a	 phenomenon	 in	which	 the	 exclusionary	 and	 inclusive	 co-
exist.	The	social	policy	contract	is	synonymous	not	only	with	the	restitutive	role	that	Durkheim	
understood	contract	law	to	play	in	modern	society	(mending	broken	relationships).	Rather,	the	
social	 policy	 contract	 functions	 both	 restitutively	 and,	 at	 least	 potentially,	 repressively	 (its	
breach	being	 punishable	 ultimately	 in	 the	 form	of	 exclusion	 from	access	 to	 the	public	 goods	
provided	 by	 the	 state).	 Durkheim’s	 analysis	 is	 also	 relevant	 insofar	 as	 he	 identifies	 social	
solidarity	as	having	moral	 foundations.	Again,	his	notions	of	 individualism	and	 the	conscience	
collective	 are,	 it	 is	 argued,	 relevant	 to	 understanding	 the	 sources	 of	 social	 solidarity	 within	




increasingly	 populist	 collective	 belief	 system	whose	 reaffirmation	 depends	 upon	 the	 possible	
punishment	 of	 those	 who	 flout	 the	 values	 associated	 with	 individualism.	 Moreover,	 the	
constructed	status	of	those	individuals	–	their	lumping	together	in	a	category	defined,	inter	alia,	
by	what	Bauman	calls	“uselessness”	–	also	works	to	strengthen	the	conscience	collective,	and,	







sources	 of	 social	 solidarity	 –	 both	 the	 populism	 of	 punishing	 and	 the	 individualism	 of	 the	
inclusive	 society	 –	 and	 the	 persistence	 of	 social	 suffering.	 Specifically,	 the	 objective	 is	 to	
demonstrate	 the	masking	 properties	 of	 the	 social	 policy	 contract	 and,	 thus,	 of	 the	 forms	 of	
social	solidarity	which	it	expresses.	What	do	they	hide	and	leave	unaddressed?	And	with	what	
consequences?	 In	 order	 to	 concretise	 the	 discussion,	 reference	will	 be	made	 to	 that	 area	 of	
social	policy	that	has	formed	the	focal	point	so	far	–	that	is,	unemployment	and	workfare.	






analysis	 reflect	what	goes	 in	practice?	Drawing	on	a	number	of	empirical	 studies	of	workfare	
programmes	 in	 both	 the	 US	 and	 Europe,	 Handler	 provides	 an	 indication	 of	 the	 possible	
trajectories	of	unemployed	persons	who	are	subject	to	workfare	or	labour	activation	policies.44	
In	 respect	 of	 the	 general	 nature	 of	 the	 employment	 market	 in	 the	 US,	 Handler	 notes	 that,	
despite	the	creation	of	more	than	20	million	jobs	since	1990,	there	has	been	little	 increase	in	
the	 real	 wages	 of	 less	 skilled	 and	 less	 educated	 workers.	 Compounded	 by	 the	 fact	 of	 the	







seek	 out	 those	 who	 are	 educated	 and	 have	 a	 degree	 of	 work	 experience.	 Should	 they	 find	
employment,	 they	 can	 look	 forward	 to	 an	 average	 annual	wage	 of	 between	 $8,000-$15,144	
(2001	figures),	with	few,	if	any,	benefits.	Administrative	pressures	on	those	managing	workfare	













Work	and	Pensions.46	Amongst	other	 things,	 the	evidence	noted	 in	 this	 review	 indicates	 that	
workfare	in	the	form	of	unpaid	work	experience	does	little	to	increase	the	likelihood	of	securing	
employment,	and	 indeed	may	reduce	the	chances	of	doing	so.	Only	5%	of	 the	participants	 in	
one	programme	–	the	Work	Experience	Programme	in	New	York	City	–	for	example,	ended	up	
finding	 work.	 Involvement	 in	 another,	 Wisconsin	 Works	 (W-2),	 failed	 to	 result	 in	 sustained	
employment	 in	 unsubsidised	work	 for	 the	majority	 of	 participants.	 Additionally,	 in	 1997	 the	
incomes	of	about	half	of	those	leaving	the	programme	fell	below	the	poverty	line.	The	tenor	of	
these	 findings	 was	 replicated	 in	 evidence	 from	 the	 Ontario	 Works	 workfare	 programme	 in	





While	 Handler	 acknowledges	 that	 the	 empirical	 evidence	 of	 activation	 policies	 in	 Western	
European	countries	 is	not	conclusive,	and	that	there	have	been	successes,	he	notes	that	such	
programmes	 pose	 risks	 to	 the	 most	 vulnerable	 populations.	 In	 France,	 for	 example,	
employment	programmes	 resulting	 from	 the	main	activation	 scheme	 (the	Revenue	Minimum	
D’insertion	 –	 RMI)	 have	 the	 following	 consequence:	 ‘Clients	 move	 from	 one	 placement	 to	
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another	 in	 ‘bad	 jobs’	 –	 poorly	 paid	with	 few	prospects	 for	 permanent,	 regular	 jobs.[47]	Most	
RMI	 leavers	 are	 dissatisfied	 with	 their	 jobs.	 Workers	 [those	 administering	 the	 programmes]	
concentrate	on	 the	most	employable.’48	Referring	 to	a	 study	by	Finn	and	Blackmore	of	 some	
youths	on	the	New	Deal	for	Young	people	in	the	UK,	Handler	reports	how	critical	they	were	of	
Jobseeker’s	Agreements,	including	their	view	that	too	many	people	were	obliged	to	undertake	
‘meaningless	 activities’.	 Like	 the	 US	 experience	 noted	 by	 Handler,	 Finn	 and	 Blackmore	
concluded	 that	 the	 core	 difficulty	was	 that	many	 of	 those	who	 find	work	 through	 activation	
programmes	 often	 become	 unemployed	 again	 –	 the	 so-called	 ‘revolving	 door’	 syndrome.	
Similarly,	the	evidence	in	some	Western	European	countries	points	to	the	fact	that	 it	 is	those	
who	are	‘younger,	better	educated,	and	with	fewer	social	problems’,	together	with	those	who	
have	 previously	 undertaken	 skilled	 work,	 that	 benefit	 from	 the	 best	 opportunities	 available	
through	activation	programmes.	
What	of	the	UK?	Before	considering	some	empirical	evidence	of	the	operation	of	workfare	 in	
the	UK,	 it	 is	 crucial	 to	outline	 the	broader	macro-economic	picture,	 especially	 as	 regards	 the	
distribution	of	 income	and	the	changing	nature	of	the	 labour	market.	The	most	recent	report	
on	disposable	household	 income	and	 income	distribution	 shows	 that,	 since	 records	began	 in	
1961,	 Britain	 has	 never	 been	 as	 unequal	 a	 society	 in	 terms	 of	 income	 distribution	 as	 it	 is	

















receives	 13%	of	 all	 income,	with	 the	 top	 10%	 receiving	 27.3%.50	 The	bottom	10%	of	 earners	
receives	 2.6%	 of	 the	whole.	 Apart	 from	 Switzerland,	 the	UK	 has	 the	 highest	 level	 of	 income	
inequality	in	Europe.	In	the	space	of	20	years	(1988-2008),	the	average	chief	executive	of	a	FTSE	
company	has	gone	from	earning	17	times	the	UK	average	salary	to	earning	75.5	times	it.	
The	nature	of	the	 labour	market	has	also	changed	 in	recent	years.	 In	 its	report	on	vulnerable	
employment	 in	 the	 UK,	 the	 TUC	 Commission	 on	 Vulnerable	 Employment	 (‘the	 Commission’)	
notes	 that	while,	as	we	saw	earlier,	unemployment	has	 fallen	markedly	over	 the	 last	decade,	





protection	 offered	 to	 other	 temporary	 workers.	 Thus,	 while	 those	 working	 for	 agencies	 are	













compared	 to	 other	 workers,	 resulting	 in	 low	 levels	 of	 job	 satisfaction;	 2)	 less	 pay	 than	
permanent	 employees	 with	 similar	 skills;	 and,	 3)	 fewer	 benefits,	 including	 pensions.53	
Importantly,	the	Commission	discovered	that	 it	 is	 increasingly	 likely	for	 low	paid	workers	who	
use	Jobcentre	Plus	to	be	offered	agency	work.	
As	well	as	the	increasing	prevalence	of	low	paid	work,	the	Commission	notes	how	the	erosion	
of	 various	 forms	 of	 protection	 for	 workers	 from	 the	 1980s	 onwards,	 such	 as	 collective	
agreements	 between	 employers	 and	 the	 unions,	 has	 contributed	 to	 the	 rise	 in	 vulnerable	
employment.	 This	 re-regulation	 of	 the	 labour	 market54	 was	 considered	 to	 be	 a	 necessary	
condition	 of	 the	 realisation	 of	 economic	 growth	 and	 prosperity,	 and	while,	 according	 to	 the	
Commission,	 a	 variety	 of	 measures	 passed	 by	 New	 Labour	 stemmed	 the	 flow	 (e.g.	 working	
families	tax	credits),	the	OECD	can	still	report	that,	save	for	the	US,	workers	in	the	UK	today	are	
afforded	the	least	protection	in	the	developed	world.	Estimating	the	number	of	workers	in	the	
UK	 ‘trapped	 in	 a	 continual	 round	 of	 low-paid	 and	 insecure	work	where	mistreatment	 is	 the	


















stand,	 for	 many	 a	 job	 simply	 amounts	 to	 a	 poor	 substitute	 for	 the	 indignity	 of	 welfare:	
‘Government	rightly	emphasises	the	role	of	work	in	escaping	poverty	and	social	exclusion.	The	
end	 of	mass	 unemployment	 is	 a	 great	 social	 advance.	 But	 replacing	 the	 hopelessness	 of	 the	
dole	 queue	with	 the	misery	 of	 dead-end	 lives	 trapped	 in	 insecure,	 low-paid,	 low-skilled	 jobs	
should	be	just	as	much	a	target	for	progressive	political	action.’56	
The	 latter	 point	 suggests	 the	 likely	 trajectory	 of	 those	 leaving	 welfare	 for	 employment.	 The	
same	problems	 confront	 those	 subject	 to	workfare	 in	 the	UK.	Reflecting	on	 the	 findings	of	 a	
series	 of	 local	 case	 studies	 of	 ‘inclusive,	 community-based	 approaches	 to	 accessing	
employment’	 for	 a	number	of	disadvantaged	groups,	Carpenter	 et	 al	 conclude	 that	 the	main	
criticism	made	by	 those	engaged	 in	 these	workfare	programmes	was	 the	poor	quality	of	 the	
work	 on	 offer	 in	 the	 labour	 market.57	 While	 respondents	 appreciated	 the	 assistance	 and	
support	provided	to	them	to	apply	for	jobs	and	update	skills,	these	tended	to	provide	access	to	
substandard	 employment.	 More	 generally,	 the	 authors	 note	 that	 (re-)entry	 into	 the	 labour	
market	 for	 those	 at	 the	 lower	 end	 of	 the	 socio-economic	 spectrum	 often	means	 precarious	















and	Walker	confirm	these	 findings	 in	respect	of	 the	previous	Labour	Government’s	New	Deal	
workfare	programmes.59	They	note	that	many	New	Deal	jobs	are	low	paid	and,	contrary	to	the	
previous	 Government’s	 aspirational	 agenda,	 become	 the	 indefinite	 lot	 of	 those	 who	 enter	
them:	
Getting	 a	 job	was	 only	 the	 first	 step,	 said	 the	 chancellor,	 Gordon	 Brown.	 People	 should	 be	 helped	 to	move	
upwards,	to	train,	 improve	themselves	and	get	promoted.	But	the	vast	majority	are	going	nowhere.	Armies	of	
cleaners,	carers,	caterers,	cashiers	and	clerical	workers	paid	rock-bottom	wages	cannot	all	become	supervisors	




One	of	 the	 core	 implications	 of	 Carpenter	 et	 al’s	 studies	was	 the	 failure	 of	 current	workfare	
social	policies	in	the	UK	to	address	underlying	structural	 inequalities,	such	as	class,	that	affect	
people’s	employment	trajectories	after	being	on	welfare.	
The	 foregoing	 reports	 and	 empirical	 analyses	 assist	 in	 putting	 some	 flesh	 on	 the	 bones	 of	
Rosanvallon’s	 ‘inclusive	society’.	 Importantly,	they	reveal	a	 less	rosy	picture	than	that	painted	
by	his	philosophical	analysis,	and	point	to	key	structural	factors	–	such	as	class,	poor	education,	
and	the	low	paid	and	precarious	nature	of	the	labour	market	–	that	impede	the	permanent	and	
successful	 re-integration	 into	society	of	many	of	 those	on	workfare.	What	 is	 secured	through	
the	assimilation	 characteristic	of	workfare	 is	 not	necessarily	 an	escape	 from	poverty	 and	 the	
heightened	 possibility	 of	 de-socialisation	 that	 poverty	 engenders,	 but	 its	 entrenchment	 and	












certain	 populations	 as	 useless,	 dangerous,	 etc.	 –	 and	 the	 social	 solidarity	 of	which	 these	 are	
meant	to	act	as	sources,	that	have	become	most	closely	associated	with	contract	in	the	context	
of	social	policy.	This	association	pays	great	political	dividends,	lending	much-needed	legitimacy	
to	 governments	 seeking	 to	 justify	 their	 role	 in	 the	 light	 of	 having	 overseen	 the	 steady	
retrenchment	of	the	welfare	state	(much	like	Wacquant’s	point,	noted	earlier,	about	the	role	of	
punitive	measures	today).	But	contract	has	this	political	effect	in	a	manner	which,	ironically,	is	
de-politicising.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 moralising	 aspects	 of	 the	 social	 policy	 contract,	 and	 the	
(socially)	 cohesive	 ends	 to	 which	 they	 are	 directed,	 succeed	 in	 obscuring	 the	 underlying	
conflicts	over	the	nature	of	the	types	of	structural	factors,	noted	above,	that	play	such	a	central	
role	 in	 determining	 the	 prospects	 of	 the	 state’s	 citizens.	What	 kind	 of	 system	 produces	 the	
‘revolving	 door’	 syndrome	 and	 the	 precariousness	 that	 flows	 from	 this;	 why,	 in	 a	 system	
supposedly	 guided	 by	 equal	 opportunities	 for	 all,	 are	 those	with	 greater	 qualifications	more	
likely	to	be	granted	priority	within	workfare	programmes?	Answers	to	these	questions	demand	
the	confrontation	of	issues	and	factors	that	the	social	policy	contract	is	inadequately	designed	
to	address.	 For,	 rather	 than	concerning	 ‘moral’	 issues,	 they	 revolve	around	questions	of,	and	
conflicts	 over,	 inter	 alia,	 political	 economy,	 class,	 income	 inequality,	 education,	 and	 the	
bureaucratic	 compulsion	 to	 meet	 targets.	 But	 the	 particular	 power	 of	 contract	 here	 is	 not	
merely	to	obscure	these	questions	and	conflicts	by	converting	them	into	‘moral’	issues,	but	to	








order	and	consensus,	not	 conflict,	with	which	 this	 type	of	 contract	 is	bound	up.	 The	 result	 is	
that,	because	debate	about	the	underlying	systemic	issues	all	but	vanishes	from	the	public	and	
political	spheres	–	their	terrain	colonised	by	a	moralising	discourse	of	autonomous	individuals,	
responsibilisation,	 and	 anti-social	 behaviour	 –	 the	 underlying	 structural	 factors	 proceed	
unhindered,	their	operation	continuing	to	produce	the	kinds	of	detrimental	consequences	for	
some	citizens	detailed	 in	 the	empirical	material	 set	out	above.	Contract	 therefore	masks	and	
subdues	 in	 the	 field	 of	 social	 policy,	 its	 de-politicising	 character	 having	 important	 political	
purchase	whilst	ensuring	the	unimpeded	production	of	debilitating	social	costs.	
Conclusion	
In	 contrast	 to	 those	who	 argue	 that	 we	 are	 currently	 experiencing	 a	 crisis	 of	 solidarity,	 this	
article	has	suggested	that	different	forms	of	social	solidarity	are	emerging	today	through	that	
institution	 –	 the	 welfare	 state	 –	 most	 frequently	 cited	 as	 evidence	 of	 the	 so-called	 crisis.	
Durkheim’s	typology	of	social	solidarity	in	The	Division	of	Labour	in	Society,	and	his	later	work	
on	individualism,	provides	a	useful	resource	for	thinking	through	the	nature	of	these	different	
forms	 –	 especially	 their	moral	 foundations.	 But	while	 the	 emerging	 forms	 of	 social	 solidarity	
detectable	 via	 today’s	 social	 policy	 contracts	 may	 be	 different	 in	 nature	 to	 the	 “collective	
insurance”	solidarity	of	the	post-WWII	welfare	state,	Durkheim’s	work	demonstrates	that	they	
are	 by	 no	 means	 novel.	 Indeed,	 from	 the	 analysis	 conducted	 in	 this	 article,	 they	 are	
reversionary,	 replicating	 sources	 of	 social	 solidarity	 to	 be	 found	 in	 earlier,	 sometimes	much	
earlier,	 societies.	 The	 argument	 pursued	 here	 has	 not	 only	 been	 that	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	
understand	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 emerging	 forms	 of	 social	 solidarity	 today,	 but,	 through	 that	
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endeavour,	 to	 grasp	 better	 how	 these	 forms	 are	 bound	 up	 with	 the	 persistence	 of	 social	
suffering	 and	 the	 misery	 and	 indignity	 that	 Bauman	 identifies	 as	 key	 features	 of	 our	 post-
Keynesian	age.	
